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Public-private partnerships and the politics
of alcohol policy in England: the Coalition
Government’s Public Health ‘Responsibility
Deal’
Benjamin Hawkins1* and Jim McCambridge2
Abstract
Background: The 2010–2015 Conservative-led Coalition Government launched their flagship Public Health Responsibility
Deal (PHRD) for England in 2011; a year before their alcohol strategy. This co-regulatory regime placed alcohol industry
actors at the heart of policy-making, but was viewed with scepticism by public health actors. This article examines the
ways in which the PHRD structured the alcohol policy environment throughout this period, which included the rejection
of evidence-based policies such as minimum unit pricing.
Methods: This article draws on 26 semi-structured interviews with policy actors (parliamentarians, civil servants, civil
society actors and academics) in 2018. Respondents were identified and recruited using purposive sampling. Interviews
were recorded, transcribed and analysed using thematic coding.
Results: The PHRD shaped the context of alcohol policy development at Westminster throughout this period. It
circumscribed the policy space by taking evidence-based measures not amenable to industry partnership off the
agenda. While the PHRD created important opportunities for industry engagement with policy-makers, it undermined
public health actors’ access to government, particularly following their withdrawal from the process. Moreover, the
PHRD demonstrates the enduring appeal of partnership as a policy idea for governments, despite a lack of evidence of
their effectiveness.
Conclusions: This study of the PHRD demonstrates the ways in which industry actors are able to influence policy
through long-term relationship building and partnership working on policy decision-making. Whilst such partnership
approaches may appear to have the potential to mitigate some of alcohol harms, they create fundamental conflicts of
interest, and may undermine the very causes they seek to further.
Keywords: Responsibility Deal, Alcohol policy, Alcohol industry, Corporations, Self-regulation, Co-regulation, UK
Background
This article examines the Conservative-Liberal Democrat
Coalition Government’s Public Health Responsibility
Deal (PHRD) [1] and the structuring effects this had on
UK alcohol policy debates in the period between 2010
and 2015. The origins of the PHRD can be traced back
to the period before the 2010 general election at which
the Coalition Government came to power. Concerns
about rising burden of obesity and non-communicable
diseases (NCDs) such as cancer, heart disease,
hypotension and stroke increased pressure for govern-
ment action to tackle alcohol consumption, poor diet
and lack of exercise associated with these conditions. In
response to this, the Conservative Party’s health lead,
Andrew Lansley, convened a Public Health Commission
(PHC) involving leading companies in the food, alcohol,
retail and fitness industries in 2008 [2]. The PHC was
chaired by Dave Lewis of Unilever, which also provided
the premises and the secretariat for the Commission’s
meetings.
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In the same year, the Scottish Government published
its draft alcohol strategy, which included a consultation
on introducing minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol
[3]. Pricing measures such as MUP are strongly sup-
ported by international research evidence on policies to
address alcohol related harms [4], but opposed by the
alcohol industry, which favours instead voluntary and
self- and co-regulatory approaches such as the PHRD
[5]. Co-regulatory regimes refer to institutionalised en-
gagement between government and industry actors to
deliver policy goals such as the PHRD. Self-regulatory
regimes permit industry bodies to regulate their activ-
ities with minimal government intervention or oversight,
and include activities such as the Portman Group’s code
of practice on the marketing of alcohol products. While
some of the policy studies and public administration
literature suggests that self- and co-regulation may be
advantageous [6, 7], their adoption in the field of alcohol
(and health policy more generally) has been widely criti-
cised by public health actors. Both self- and co-
regulatory regimes have limited evidence of their effect-
iveness [4] and, it is argued, create unavoidable conflicts
of interests (COI) between the profit motives of alcohol
companies and the goal of protecting public health [8,
9]. Moreover, government involvement confers legitim-
acy on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) work of
industry actors in ways which promote their corporate
interests without addressing health needs.
The Scottish alcohol strategy represented a sea change
in UK alcohol policy, which had heretofore adhered to
an industry favourable agenda [10]. This followed suc-
cessful efforts by health advocates to reframe policy de-
bates in terms of evidence-based, whole population
interventions [5, 11], and vital preparatory work on
MUP undertaken within the Department of Health (DH)
in London [12], such as commissioning the first model-
ling of the effects of alcohol pricing by researchers at the
University of Sheffield. Following a six-year delay in im-
plementation after the MUP legislation was passed by
the Scottish Parliament, as a result of industry legal chal-
lenges [13, 14], MUP entered into force in Scotland in
May 2018. Having been included in the government’s
2012 alcohol strategy [15], plans to introduce MUP in
England have been stalled since 2013 with no end to the
hiatus in sight at the time of writing [16].
Previous studies have evaluated the effectiveness of the
PHRD as a public health intervention and the success of
participants in meeting its objectives [17–19]. The aim
of the current article is to examine the political conse-
quences – as opposed to population health effects – of
the PHRD’s Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network
(RDAN) within the wider context of UK alcohol policy
debates since 2010. In so doing, we identify the role,
which co-regulatory regimes such as the PHRD can play
within the alcohol industry’s political strategies and the
effects these may have on the development of public
health policies. As the key alcohol policy controversy in
this period, MUP provides essential context for the
policy developments analysed here [20]. This study will,
therefore, examine attempts by industry and other actors
to link the PHRD to the issue of MUP, and how far
this may have been relevant to the reversal of the
Government’s commitment to introduce the policy in
England [21–24].
Whilst our focus is on the alcohol industry and UK
alcohol policy, similarities have been identified between
industry strategies in other sectors including the tobacco
and pharmaceutical industry [25–28]. As such, the ana-
lysis presented here is of wider relevance to understand-
ing the impact of co-regulatory regimes in structuring
health policy debates and favouring vested interests in
other policy areas and policy-making contexts.
The PHRD: an overview
The PHRD is a co-regulatory regime designed to bring
together industry actors, public health NGOs, medical
associations and other concerned parties (e.g. the Police)
with policymakers to work towards improving public
health through a series of agreed activities (see Table 1).
The PHRD included, amongst others, a specific alcohol
network made up of government, public health and alco-
hol industry participants, including the UK’s largest
supermarket chains [1]. Six public health bodies – Alco-
hol Concern, The British Association for the Study of
the Liver, The British Liver Trust, The British Medical
Association, The Institute of Alcohol Studies and The
Royal College of Physicians – who had been involved in
the initial discussions around the formation of the
RDAN refused to sign up to the agreement, citing con-
flicts of interest arising from alcohol industry involve-
ment, the focus on weak, industry favourable policy
approaches and the lack of clarity about enforcement
mechanisms should industry fail to meet their commit-
ments [29].
The RDAN was chaired jointly by Prof. Mark Bellis
from the Faculty of Public Health and Jeremy Beadles,
the Chief Executive of the Wine and Spirit Trade
Association, with ministerial oversight provided by Paul
Burstow MP, Minister of State for Care Services at the
Department of Health (DH) Services. Jeremy Beadles
was replaced by Henry Ashworth, Chief Executive of the
Portman Group in February 2012. Prof. Nick Sheron
replaced Mark Bellis as Co-Chair in November that year
[22]. Tensions between industry and public health actors
came to a head once more in the summer of 2013,
following the announcement by the UK Government
that it would not be proceeding with its plan to intro-
duce MUP for alcohol in England. This led to the high
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profile resignation of the remaining public health bodies,
including Cancer Research UK, Alcohol Research UK,
the Faculty of Public Health and the UK Health Forum
leaving only two health organisations [30]; both with
financial ties to the alcohol industry (Addaction and
Mentor UK) on board [31]. With the departure of al-
most all the non-governmental public health bodies the
RDAN was fatally wounded although it did continue to
meet during 2014 in the hope that the departed actors
may be convinced to return. It was formally disbanded
in 2015 with limited publicity.
The RDAN centred on a list of pledges made by the in-
dustry, apparently designed to reduce the harms arising
from alcohol consumption. In keeping with industry ac-
tors’ policy preferences [32], and wider corporate social re-
sponsibility activities [33], the pledges reflect a largely
individual, versus population-level, framing of alcohol-
related harm and how it may be reduced. Population mea-
sures are found by the existing research literature to be
the most effective means of reducing harms [4], but are
opposed by industry because – in seeking aggregate,
population-level reductions in consumption – as they
threaten to reduce sales and profits. The highest profile
initiatives emerging from the of the RDAN centred on al-
cohol labelling (A1) and a commitment by the industry to
remove ‘a billion units’ of alcohol from the market on a
voluntary basis as a result of product reformulations and
the introduction of lower alcohol products (A8).
The PHRD was subject to an independent evaluation,
undertaken by researchers at the London School of
Hygiene and Topical Medicine [19]. This concluded that
the pledges had had limited impact on consumption and
harms and that in many cases focussed on activities
already being undertaken by the industry, rather than on
additional measures [18]. The evaluation also found also
that commitments on product labelling (A1) and the
‘billion unit pledge’ (A8) had not been fully achieved,
whilst others lacked clearly time-limited and measurable
deliverables (A2, A3, A6) and thus were thus not amen-
able to accurate evaluation [18].
Table 1 The Responsibility Deal Alcohol Network Pledges
Pledge Details
A1. We will ensure that over 80% of products on shelf (by December 2013) will have labels with clear unit content, NHS guidelines and a
warning about drinking when pregnant.
A2. We will provide simple and consistent information in the on-trade (e.g. pubs and clubs), to raise awareness of the unit content of alcoholic
drinks, and we will also explore together with health bodies how messages around drinking guidelines and the associated health harms
might be communicated.
A3. We will provide simple and consistent information as appropriate in the off-trade (supermarkets and off-licences) as well as other marketing
channels (e.g. in-store magazines), to raise awareness of the units, calorie content of alcoholic drinks, NHS drinking guidelines, and the health
harms associated with exceeding guidelines.
A4. We commit to ensuring effective action is taken in all premises to reduce and prevent under-age sales of alcohol (primarily through rigorous
application of Challenge 21 and Challenge 25).
A5. We commit to maintaining the levels of financial support and in-kind funding for Drinkaware and the “Why let the Good times go bad?”
campaign as set out in the Memoranda of Understanding between Industry, Government and Drinkaware.
A6. We commit to further action on advertising and marketing, namely the development of a new sponsorship code requiring the promotion of
responsible drinking, not putting alcohol adverts on outdoor poster sites within 100 m of schools and adhering to the Drinkaware brand
guidelines to ensure clear and consistent usage.
A7(a). In local communities we will provide support for schemes appropriate for local areas that wish to use them to address issues around social
and health harms, and will act together to improve joined up working between such schemes operating in local areas as:
▪ Best Bar None and Pubwatch, which set standards for on-trade premises
▪ Purple Flag which make awards to safe, consumer friendly areas
▪ Community Alcohol Partnerships, which currently support local partnership working to address issues such as under-age sales and alcohol
related crime, are to be extended to work with health and education partners in local Government
▪ Business Improvement Districts, which can improve the local commercial environment.
A7(b). To support our pledge to provide schemes appropriate for local areas that wish to use them to address issues around social and health
harms, we will fund and/or support industry action in Local Alcohol Action Areas, by ensuring that suitable existing partnership schemes are
in the process of being rolled out in Local Alcohol Action Areas by March 2015.
A8(a). As part of action to reduce the number of people drinking above the guidelines, we have already signed up to a core commitment to
“foster a culture of responsible drinking which will help people drink within guidelines”. To support this we will remove 1bn units of alcohol
sold annually from the market by December 2015, principally through improving consumer choice of lower alcohol products.
A8(b). To support our pledge to remove a billion units of alcohol sold annually from the market, we will carry out a review of the alcohol content
and container sizes of all alcohol products in our portfolio. By December 2014 we will not produce or sell any carbonated product with
more than (4) units of alcohol in a single-serve can.
A9. We will financially support the Lifeskills Education and Alcohol Foundation (LEAF) with a minimum of £250,000 as a start-up fund. Subject to
favourable reporting and evaluation of delivery, we will seek to increase programme scope through funding from the alcohol industry and
others.
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Methods
This article draws on 26 semi-structured interviews
undertaken by the first author between February and
October 2018 with civil servants and government actors
(n = 8) from relevant ministries and agencies, members
of the U.K. Parliament (n = 1) and the Scottish Parlia-
ment (n = 1) and civil society actors (from alcohol
related NGOs, medical associations and public health
bodies) (n = 13) and academic researchers (n = 3) in
London and Edinburgh [34, 35]. Where interviewees fell
within more than one category they were classified
according the role through which they engaged with the
PHRD and were thus identified as respondents for this
study. Interviewees were initially identified and recruited
using purposive sampling based on earlier analyses of
the UK alcohol policy context [5, 13, 14, 20, 36–38] and
through examining relevant documents and websites
(e.g. those relating to the PHRD and RDAN) to under-
take a preliminary stakeholder mapping [39, 40].
We decided not to interview industry actors in at the
outset, departing from the approach used in our earlier
interview study of UK alcohol policy. This decision was
taken for a number of reasons including uncertainties
about access and the additional complexity anticipated
in the data in light of our previous findings, which
exposed industry actors in ways they would prefer not to
be represented (whereas previously we were unknown to
industry actors). An important implication of this deci-
sion is that the dataset is restricted to perceptions of
industry actors as held by other actors. Nonetheless, we
contend that it is possible to understand the dynamics of
the PHRD through triangulation of perspectives from
interviewees from different sectors, including those who
had engaged with and worked closely with industry
actors. In addition, snowball sampling was used whereby
interviewees were asked to suggest further respondents.
These responses, alongside the data generated by inter-
views, were used to assess when data saturation had
been reached.
Respondents were contacted via email and by phone
and interviews were undertaken at a place of their
convenience, usually their places of work, in keeping
with the ethics approval granted by the University of
York. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed,
and were semi-structured following a protocol devel-
oped by both authors in advance (available to re-
searchers on request). As this article emerges from a
wider study of UK alcohol policy, interviews covered
the PHRD and other key developments in UK alcohol
policy since 2010. While the same topics were ex-
plored with all respondents, questions were adapted
to interviewees from different settings and different
sectors (i.e. specific questions were asked of policy
makers from different ministries or of other types of
actor to focus on their specific policy expertise and
involvements in the issues being discussed). Finally,
such interviews require the flexibility to explore and
probe topics and themes which emerge in situ but
may not have been foreseen in advance. Interviews
were conducted by a reflexive practitioner highly fa-
miliar with the use of this method to study contro-
versial topics, whilst making interviewees consciously
aware of their and our positionality in the research
process [41].
Thematic analysis of the transcripts was led by the first
author in liaison with the second author, based on the 6
phases of thematic analysis identified by Braun and
Clarke and tailored to the specific requirements of the
subject matter of the current study [42]. Transcripts
were first reviewed by the first author electronically as
word documents as the first stage in a process of ana-
lysis. Parts of the text which required further clarifica-
tion through reference to the interview recording, or
which required confirmation through references to out-
side sources (e.g. relevant policy documents to confirm
dates and sequences of events), were noted with com-
ment boxes. Relevant sections of the transcripts which
related to important events, processes, concepts or
themes were coded in the text using the highlighting
tool and were recorded in a separate themes document
created to summarise and order the emerging themes
[35], usually as a paraphrased summary or precis of the
relevant section of the interview transcript, with direct
quotations also copied and pasted. As subsequent tran-
scripts were reviewed these were noted as additional
examples of existing themes or new themes were
added and relevant themes and categories were also
modified or merged to take account of additional in-
formation [35].
While the initial thematic analysis was being under-
taken by the first author the transcripts were reviewed
‘blind’ by the second author, who summarised and noted
independently key information and themes emerging
from each interview. These parallel analyses of the inter-
views formed the basis of a series of discussions between
authors which refined the key themes. The presentation
below is organised thematically and reflects the key
issues relating to the PHRD and RDAN which arose out
of the data examined. The first draft of the article was
written by the first author and worked on by the second
across several iterations of the draft. Interview based
studies such as these depend on the accounts of respon-
dents and, as such, reflect the experiences and perspec-
tives of respondents. While the principle of triangulation
[43] seeks to mitigate bias and provide as full an account
of events as possible, these are necessarily circumscribed
by the range of respondents and other data sources
available.
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Results
This is a study of the political consequences of the
PHRD. There is an explicitly temporal component to the
narrative organisation of the material in the analysis that
follows, as the order in which events surrounding the
PHRD unfolded was key in determining the develop-
ment of the wider alcohol policy context including in
connection with MUP. Events prior to the formation of
the Coalition Government, and the early adoption of the
PHRD by the new government, structured the content
of the subsequent alcohol strategy, with implications for
moves towards adopting MUP.
Shaping the ideational context of alcohol policy
development
The objective for Andrew Lansley’s PHC was to develop
partnership-based responses to NCDs involving key
industry actors, in keeping with the wider, market-
focussed ideological orientation of his party, which could
then be translated into policy following the entry of the
Conservatives to government. Asked how the PHC was
translated into policy in the form of the PHRD following
the 2010 general election, a government respondent
commented:
It seemed to happen quite seamlessly and quickly,
really, quite soon after the coalition took power, and
then the responsibility deal took shape so there was a
big responsibility deal meeting which oversaw the
initiative and then there were separate groups on
alcohol, obesity and so on. It didn’t cover tobacco. So
really it was kind of an example where what they’ve
said in opposition was really what started to happen,
and obviously there was a lot more detail to get into
once they were in government.
The introduction of the PHRD in March 2011 predated
by a year the publication of the government’s alcohol
strategy [15]. The latter included a commitment to
introduce MUP in England, alongside a range of other,
more industry favourable, policy measures in keeping
with the preceding policy regime [44]. The details of the
billion unit pledge were announced on 23 March 2012;
the very same day that the Government’s alcohol strat-
egy – encompassing the MUP commitment – was pub-
lished, although the pledge was not at all referred to in
the strategy itself.
The temporal sequencing of these alcohol policy devel-
opments meant that the alcohol strategy was developed
in a policy context which was already being shaped by
the PHRD; the origins of which are traceable back to at
least 2008. As a cornerstone of the government’s alcohol
policy, the PHRD had an important structuring effect on
subsequent policy debates in this period. As a civil
servant familiar with this process commented:
There was a well-established process that we were
keen to build upon. […] There was a Public Health
Responsibility Deal, which the Department of Health
led on and we wanted to build on that but looking at
whether there was potential for additional industry
pledges in some of the areas that we had identified.
[…] But also for us there was a framework there in
which we could build on and there were people within
the industry that led on elements of that Responsibil-
ity Deal who were able to broker a degree of consen-
sus across the industry.
The influence of the RDAN over other policy initia-
tives was confirmed by another civil servant in a differ-
ent government department:
I suppose through the forum of the responsibility
deal, civil servants saw that as their priority. [..] So,
[…] it’s how can we get this to work? How can we get
this to deliver? The minister’s priority would be in
that case the Responsibility Deal because this was a
big project; a big ideology they really wanted to push.
[…] The thing about civil servants is […] it’s almost
like they’re project managers. They’ve got a project
and they want to go forward. Yeah, I mean within
their code they’re impartial. Policy direction is set by
ministers and then it’s their job to make it work.
Circumscribing the policy space
By definition, co-regulatory regimes such as the PHRD
are designed to develop and implement measures, which
can be delivered through collaborative rather than legis-
lative measures. The decision to pursue an approach
such as the PHRD skewed the policy agenda away from
regulatory measures (such as pricing policy). Public
health actors involved with the RDAN indicate also that
the range of policy options available for discussion
within the context of the RDAN were highly circum-
scribed from the very outset. According to one public
health actor, this reflected the privileged position of the
alcohol industry in the policy’s development and their
degree of engagement with policy makers before the in-
put of public health actors was sought:
When we were first invited to engage in the
Responsibility Deal, as an initiative, we did go forth
with a bit of an open mind, well, this is a new scheme,
by the new Government, let’s see what it’s all about.
And, essentially, when we arrived at the table, it was
very clear that the entire framework of the pledges
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and the voluntary arrangements, had already been
established behind closed doors, between Government
and the alcohol industry. So, we were very aware that
the alcohol industry had very easy access to the
Government, they had regular frequent meetings with
the Government, they were in regular dialogue with
the Government. And, the Government was looking
very favourably on a self-regulatory, voluntary
approach.
This was confirmed by another public health actor with
knowledge of the establishment of the PHRD:It was
made absolutely clear to us that we could only talk
about things which were in the remit of DH. And
therefore we were not permitted to discuss fiscal
policy, MUP or any of those. Obviously we tried to do
that every meeting, but we were basically told you are
not allowed to talk to us about that.
Those measures that were open for consideration, and
which may have had some degree of effectiveness, were
taken up by the industry only to the extent they did not
undermine their commercial interests. The limits of the
voluntary approach were circumscribed by divisions
within the industry. For example, proposed measures on
labelling products with unit content information were
opposed by some manufacturers who felt their products
would be adversely effected, or seen more negatively
than others. For example, the RDAN was only able to
agree on the labelling of cider cans, rather than all con-
tainers (including bottles), because cider producers,
some of whom sell products in three-litre plastic bottles
(containing 22 units) would not agree to the measure.
Other interviewees, meanwhile, suggested measures pro-
posed by industry actors were largely activities in which
they were already engaged but were seeking to rebrand
within the context of the RDAN rather than developing
new approaches:
Sometimes what we were being presented with, was
more of what the industry was doing already, rather
than an opportunity to discuss perhaps collectively
how we might try something different.
For some respondents it was clear that participation in
the RDAN, and the narrow policy agenda this implied,
was a key industry strategy for diverting attention away
from more effective policy options, which they opposed,
and which could not be delivered through this mechan-
ism. This was echoed by a public health actor with
knowledge of the RDAN process:
They were doing what you would expect them to do
which was protect their bottom line. You know their
duty is to protect shareholder value; they have not
duty to protect the health of the population, that’s up
to the government. So the only reason they were there
was to defer or prevent effective policy. I think it was
successful in doing so.
The RDAN offered an environment in which alcohol
industry actors were key partners in policy-making. This
undermined the ability of government to act independ-
ently because the approach centred on the co-production
of policy. In the words of one civil servant with intimate
knowledge of the process:
And again working with the grain of the industry,
looking at where we can build on existing frameworks
[…]. We wanted to be almost like a critical friend
really, looking at that and challenging them to go
further in certain areas. Again, this is an opportunity
for the industry to demonstrate how serious they were
about doing some of these things. […]. We would
regularly draw on bits of evidence from the police,
from alcohol charities, public health practitioners etc
around particular products or retail practices or
promotions or whatever it might be, and ask the
industry to account for those and to discuss how the
industry could do things differently. That’s the form
that that dialogue took.
The PHRD thus offered industry actors a highly for-
malised mechanism through which they were able to
manage the alcohol policy environment through ongoing
engagement with civil servants, who were, in turn, under
pressure to deliver the policies decided upon at minister-
ial level. As one senior civil servant commented in rela-
tion to the industry:
It was through the responsibility deal […] they would
be engaging all the time. They are sort of very good at
that sort of constant sort of trying to engage with civil
servants all the time, which I think has the effect of
putting them at the top of civil servants’ minds.
You’ve also got their engagement with ministers
themselves through whatever mechanisms they use
[…]. It’s almost trying to tie civil servants in knots.
[…] sort of constantly demanding things of them,
wanting answers to things. […] it’s almost as if they
set challenges […], what’s happening on that? What
are you going to do about that?
An opportunity for industry
The PHRD created an institutionalised mechanism
through which industry actors could make plausibly
legitimate demands on key parts of the machinery of
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government. This represented an additional call on the
time and energy of civil servants and an effective way to
shape their thinking on policy issues in which industry
actors have significant expertise and resources. As well
as the policy diverting effects of the PHRD, it had con-
siderable value to the industry in terms of their public
relations and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
agendas. Cultivating a positive image of themselves as
responsible actors who contribute to society is a key
component of alcohol companies’ efforts to avoid regula-
tion [33]. As a representative from a large UK charity
commented:
working in partnership with government, is beneficial
from a PR perspective for the industry, you know.
They would talk about being involved in it, very front
and centre. You know, ‘we’re working together with
government and other civil partners.’ It’s a huge
benefit to an industry […] not coupled with any
meaningful change in their approach to, say, on the
marketing of alcohol.
The success of efforts to persuade those in govern-
ment of their commitment to reducing harm potentially
conferred additional legitimacy on the involvement of
industry actors in policy making. For example, one civil
servant involved in the RDAN process regarded industry
commitment to the PHRD in terms of perceptions:
I have to say that my experience of then subsequently
working with the industry was one of a genuine
commitment on their part to wanting to be seen to be
doing more.
For the alcohol industry, the PHRD acts as a key point
of reference for industry actors in the context of policy
debates. It acts as an ‘artefact’ which can be pointed to
in industry documents and discourses. It has a material-
ity and a physicality in its meetings, documents and a
virtual presence online. Partnership with government
implies that industry actors are acting in a positive way,
curbing the excesses of their businesses and their cus-
tomers; a framing perpetuated by industry CSR materials
and statements, which focus on such initiatives.
The assumption that co-regulatory arrangements are
mutually beneficial to both industry and government is
implicit in the underlying logic and rationale for this ap-
proach. Partnership-based, voluntary regimes and codes
of practise are often discussed in ways that imply indus-
try actors are willing to subordinate their narrow, short-
term interests to a greater societal good. In the case of
the RDAN it appears that companies were only willing
to embrace measures that did not disadvantage them
commercially or that favoured them in comparison to
rival sectors and companies. This underlines the limita-
tions, which this type of arrangement places on policy
development and the conflicts of interest that they
engender.
A challenge for public health
For the alcohol industry the PHRD represented a con-
siderable opportunity to shape policy and cultivate its
image in the eyes of policy makers and the general pub-
lic. For public health actors, however, it quickly became
a challenge to be managed rather than an opportunity to
shape policy. NGOs and health bodies faced difficult
choices about whether to participate in the RDAN. This
led to divisions emerging within the public health and
alcohol policy communities. It was evident to some that,
in the absence of further policy developments, the part-
nership based approach embodied by the RDAN would
shape the terrain of UK alcohol policy. The conflict at
the heart of alcohol policy – between effective, evidence-
based measures favoured by public health and the indus-
try favourable approach represented by the RDAN, for
which any supportive evidence is absent – was resolved
in practice in favour of the industry. This meant the
public health actors needed to reconcile themselves to
this state of affairs, and concluded at different stages
of its development that they were unable to partici-
pate in the RDAN. As the representative of one NGO
commented:
Because, one of the main reasons why myself and
other members of the Alcohol Health Alliance
boycotted the Responsibility Deal, was because a
voluntary partnership with industry was being
launched, in the absence of a comprehensive Alcohol
Strategy, that included fiscal measures, such as
minimum unit pricing. And, we were told from the
very beginning that MUP was never going to be part
of the Responsibility Deal. Not only because the
industry would never allow it on the table but, also,
they don’t have it in their power to set prices, so it
would have been inappropriate for MUP to have been
discussed under that umbrella.
For others in the public health community, the degree
of commitment to the PHRD demonstrated by the gov-
ernment meant they felt obliged to participate in the
RDAN despite their clear reservations about its effective-
ness and the position it afforded to industry actors in
policy-making. As the implementation of the policy was
inevitable, they felt it was beholden to them to try to
mitigate its deleterious consequences and lobby for
whatever positive policy developments were possible
within its remit. As one public health respondent famil-
iar with the establishment of the RDAN commented:
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But we also knew what we were dealing with a
government who were committed to this route and,
therefore, we felt obliged to join in and to ensure that,
as far as possible, everything was evidence based and
everything was properly evaluated. […] That’s what we
continued to do up until the point at which the
government did their U-turn on alcohol strategy
because what we were told all along is that you join in
with the RDAN then we will be working on this
alcohol strategy, and it will be a good alcohol strategy.
Some health bodies participating in the RDAN perceived
their co-operation in this initiative a quid pro quo for
the introduction of pricing measures. The government’s
failure to proceed with the implementation in 2013
confirmed others’ suspicions that the course of alcohol
policy had already been set and that even participation
in the government’s flagship policy would be unable to
shape wider developments and deliver key public health
objectives.
Unlike industry actors, the PHRD had the effect of
limiting, rather than facilitating public health actors’ ac-
cess to government. This gave many in the public health
community the impression that the PHRD was essen-
tially a partnership between government and industry to
which civil society bodies were invited to add credibility,
whilst being regarded as a threat to the arrangement:
So, we had meetings, we were called in to meet the
Minister, Anne Milton, at the time. Just before we all
walked away from the Responsibility Deal, I think her
objective was to knock us into line and tell us that we
had to play ball. And, at that meeting, we said, we
simply cannot have action on alcohol that doesn’t
include addressing price. […] We weren't given as
easy access to the Ministers. The Minister only met us
when we were threatening to upset the apple cart, we
wouldn’t have got a regular meeting otherwise.
The existence of the PHRD structured the form and
content of engagement with public health actors as well
as industry. It became the default mechanism for en-
gagement with government on health issues and neces-
sarily focussed that engagement on the industry
favourable rather than public health focussed agenda,
which the PHRD institutionalised. Other channels of en-
gagement which may have existed previously were
rerouted this way. Furthermore, non-participation in a
flagship government policy was seen as a hostile act by
Ministers and made dialogue with them even harder.
This created serious dilemmas for public health actors
around the PHRD. As One NGO representative com-
mented:We were, at the time, still relatively unpopular
amongst the Government, because we’d boycotted the
Responsibility Deal. And also, there was no other
vehicle for having regular contact with Government
other than the Responsibility Deal, so we were
excluded from that. […] so it’s almost like a take it
or leave it for the NGOs, sign up to this, kind of,
fundamentally flawed model, with all sorts of
conflicts of interest in it, and have a voice and a
channel to the Government, or be completely put
by the way side. […] and, after a number of
important NGOs had decided not to participate in
the Responsibility Deal, we asked the Government
for an alternative forum that would free from
vested interest, where we could discuss policy
issues. And, we did not get that, until all NGOs
had resigned from the Responsibility Deal, and that
was following the announcement that minimum
pricing wasn’t going to happen.
For the alcohol industry, the PHRD represented not just
the institutionalisation of a highly favourable policy
regime, but a forum in which they could regularly
engage policymakers, shape the policy agenda and steer
resources away from potentially damaging policy devel-
opments. In contrast, it had damaging effects on public
health actors’ ability to advocate for the policy measures
which evidence indicates are most likely to reduce alco-
hol harm by closing off avenues of dialogue with deci-
sion makers and making health NGOs take highly public
stands against a key government policy, which alienated
them from the PHRD’s political sponsors.
The power of partnership as a policy idea
The ideas of public-private partnership in policy making,
and self- and co-regulatory agreements such as those
enshrined in the PHRD (from here on ‘partnership’)
exerted deep influence over policy actors. This was per-
haps most true of policy-makers and administrators, but
its effects were evident even amongst health advocates.
In all these groups, to different degrees, there appeared
to be an acceptance that partnership was the default ap-
proach to policy making, as the first option to be consid-
ered, before other policy measures only entered onto the
agenda once partnership had been exhausted. As such,
more interventionist policy measures, as indicated by the
evidence base to require regulation of industry actors,
are at a disadvantage from the very outset. Advocates
must make the case for their adoption from a reactive
position. Whilst the RDAN may represent an institution-
ally developed form of partnership encompassing a range
of health conditions and industries across multiple
policy debates, it is simply the latest in a long line of ex-
ample of this approach in UK alcohol policy. As one
government actor commented:
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I would say, because I’ve worked on it for quite some
time in [government], it’s a bit depressing how I think
I saw about four cycles of voluntary initiatives on
alcohol, so my feeling is the issue is for ministers and
politicians of both main parties, it’s kind of a default
approach to work in partnership with industry. It’s
just they psychologically have tended to see it as the
easier approach. If we’re not sure what to do, or if this
minimum unit pricing looks a bit difficult, it’s much
easier to get industry to do something.
In part, this reflects the lack of institutional memory
resulting from the rotation of civil servants between
posts, meaning as policy debates develop key positions
may be occupied by new people who were not in place
during previous iterations of the partnership arrange-
ments. It also recognises the power of the alcohol indus-
try in UK alcohol policy.
The government respondent cited above argued that
partnership based approaches are likely to have become
more appealing given the large cutbacks which have
occurred within the civil service since the coalition gov-
ernment came to power. These cutbacks mean that pro-
ducing evidence reviews and the background work
needed for the development of a new policy initiative
such as MUP would entail a great burden, notwithstand-
ing scepticism amongst civil servants about partnership
approaches. As one government respondent commented:
“I can remember at the time thinking, well there’s no
proof that this [partnership approaches like RDAN] has
ever worked before.”
The hold of ideas about partnership had important
effects on the public health community such that they
felt an obligation to try to make it work, despite the evi-
dence -base and the conflicts of interest they raised,
meaning that it was unlikely to be effective:
As far as we were concerned we were there to show
that we were trying to make this work as best we
could, in the knowledge it wasn’t going to have any
effect at all
This was echoed by another public health actor in-
volved in the establishment of RDAN:
The most important thing the Responsibility Deal
achieved, from my perspective, was that we tried it
and that might sound a very low-level accomplish-
ment, but it would have been very easy for industry in
the absence of us trying to sit around and say, well
anything could have been possible if the health sector
just turned up for the discussion. […] I think that the
reality is that things which will significantly reduce
alcohol sales and consumption are not going to be
agreed by an industry that relies on that for their
profits. [….] Now we can add, because we tried that,
and it didn’t.
The idea that regulatory approaches can only be con-
sidered once partnership approaches have been
attempted and shown to be ineffective is evident in other
sectors as well as alcohol. As a representative of an
NGO concerned also with food commented on both:
But if that doesn’t work, then you have to be prepared
to move to the next step, which is a more…something
with sanction, with some force behind it, something
compulsory.
Some public health actors and civil servants believed
that ongoing adherence to partnership approaches
reflected a lack of genuine political commitment to
reducing alcohol related harms via reduced consumption
as much as a misplaced faith in partnerships. The suspi-
cions about the lack of genuine political commitment to
effective policies to tackle harms via reduced consump-
tion were informed by perceptions that there are risks of
unpopular decision-making with adverse fiscal implica-
tions. Other explanations for the persistence of
partnership-based approaches resulted from a lack of
strategic thinking, and thus clarity, about the underlying
policy objective to be pursued. At the same time, gov-
ernments felt compelled to act, and be seen to be acting,
on the issue of alcohol leading to disjointed and sub-
optimal policy prescriptions. As one governmental re-
spondent commented:
the solution is put up first, and that isn’t based on
trying to solve the problem. It’s often based on more
what’s acceptable politically rather than… So I think
getting to that crux of what’s the problem and what
do we want to achieve; [...] what policies are going to
get you there?
Other government actors were strongly committed to
the partnership model as an effective way of addressing
alcohol harms. Such views often treated industry actors
and public health actors as two different interests groups
within the policy process whose views and interests need
to be balanced with one another. Asked whether it
would be possible to make alcohol policy without indus-
try engagement in the process, one governmental actor
suggested this would be suboptimal and limit policy
options open to government:
My only observation of that would be I think it would
be quite limited because really all you are left with
then doing is regulating. Now regulation has its merits
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and there is a place for regulation and there is
wonderful things you can do with regulation and we
have seen examples of that and tobacco is a good
example of that. We can regulate, we can restrict the
sale of products, we can mandate certain types of
labelling, we can do all those things, we can tax, all
these things that are the traditional toolbox of
government and that’s fine. There is always that place
for regulation. But if you want to be a bit more
imaginative in policy making, […] you have to then
look at other solutions.
Discussion
The emergence of the PHRD is vital to understanding
wider developments in UK alcohol policy since 2010,
particularly on alcohol pricing policy [20]. This is in
keeping with previous studies of alcohol industry strat-
egies in the UK [5, 13, 14, 21, 36–38], which identify
industry lobbying and framing activities designed to shift
policy debates towards self- and co-regulatory regimes
that have little supporting evidence [4]. In addition, it
adds to the wider literature on corporate political strat-
egy in other sectors [25–28]. Their support for the
PHRD reflects the determination of the industry to avoid
‘whole population’ measures such as MUP and other
forms of regulation coming onto the policy agenda,
which are viewed as detrimental to their interests.
It is important to give due regard to various limitations
of this study. The interviews were conducted some years
after the events being discussed. There is obvious poten-
tial for problems with recall, making triangulation of
different accounts essential. These accounts also should
not be regarded as purporting to offer a definitive oral
history of the RDAN; rather they are better read as
plausible narratives about events, and activities around
them and their inter-relationships, developed in good
faith by researchers on the basis of expert testimony by
key actors with access to, and knowledge of, the relevant
policy process. The data analysed do not include inter-
views with industry actors, so it is appropriate to ques-
tion the validity of the perceptions of the various actor
types, particularly in connection with study findings on
the industry itself. Similarly, how far is it possible that
interviewees were providing accounts that they believed
we wished to hear? We suggest that a careful reading of
the findings with these concerns in mind will reveal that
there is little in the material presented that could be
regarded as being contentious, and we also recommend
attention to the prominence we have given to findings
on public health as well as industry actors.
The significance of the PHRD for the alcohol industry
extended beyond simply providing a device to manage
policy-making and having additional rhetorical importance
as part of industry CSR strategies. The PHRD structured
wider policy debates in this period and the forms of
engagement between government, the industry and public
health actors. It involved a hitherto unparalleled institutio-
nalisation of industry involvement in alcohol policy mak-
ing. As a consequence, it fostered divisions within the
public health community about how to respond to a hostile
policy environment and whether to participate in the
PHRD. In declining to participate in, or withdrawing from,
the government’s key public health policy initiative, health
actors input into policy-making and access to key decision
makers was diminished at precisely the same time that in-
dustry influence was secured. For the alcohol industry,
therefore, this was a double victory.
The decision to pursue the PHRD in advance of the
government alcohol strategy made it the key political
priority for civil servants in the DH and the Home
Office; the main government departments tasked with
delivering alcohol policy. Other policy initiatives were
marginalised in this context. MUP, for instance, came
onto the Westminster policy agenda, and into the alco-
hol strategy, via the initiatives within the Cabinet Office,
with DH and Home Office unaware of its planned inclu-
sion until the very final stages of the process. This
reflects the alternative (RDAN-focussed) policy agendas
established within these key ministries and the lack of
political ownership evident for the most effective policy
proposal emerging in UK alcohol policy in this period.
The formation of the PHC, and its development into
the PHRD, demonstrate the effective ways in which
industry actors are able to influence policy through
long-term engagement and relationship building with
key policy-makers and the delivery of policy goods for
government, as well as the value of engaging with political
parties whilst in opposition [32, 38]. The adoption of
partnership-based approaches and co-regulatory regimes,
in the PHRD, systematically skewed the incoming govern-
ment’s policy agenda towards the least effective forms of
policy interventions from the very outset and created a
path dependency for subsequent policy development.
Despite the problems examined above, and widely ar-
ticulated within the public health community, the idea
of co-operation and engagement with industry ‘partners’
retains a strong hold over governmental actors and even
many within the public health sector. This is evident
most recently in the controversial decision of Public
Health England to partner with industry body Drinka-
ware for the delivery of public messaging campaigns
[45]. However, the prevalence and the enduring appeal
of partnership-based approaches in health is not limited
to alcohol or to the UK. As such, the findings here are
of relevance to policy makers and advocates working on
other issues and in other contexts. This article identifies
potential ways of thinking about research questions and
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methods for answering them in relation to the policy
structuring effects of co-regulatory regimes. These in-
sights could be applied within, for instance, the food and
beverage industry, in other national settings, at local and
regional level and in supra-national settings such as the
EU and WHO, as well as to public health actors, as has
been done here.
When faced with decisions on how to design and
implement policy measures, particularly those which
address major societal and public health challenges,
governments could reverse the current logic. While
regulation is currently considered only where voluntary
approaches and partnership have failed, policy makers
should instead start with the research evidence for the
most effective responses. Partnership could be restricted
to particular stages or aspects of the policy process, for
example in respect of the implementation of policy deci-
sions made in the public interest. Strong protections
against the influence of vested-interests would still need
to be adopted. Whilst partnership approaches may imply
the ability to mitigate some of harm done by alcohol, as
they have developed in UK alcohol policy, they under-
mine the very causes they seek to further.
Conclusion
Self- and co-regulatory regimes, based on partnership ap-
proaches between government and industry have been ex-
tensively criticised within alcohol policy and within the
wider field of public health on the basis that such
approaches are ineffective and ignore the prevailing re-
search evidence on effective policies to address harms.
Drawing on insights from the corporate actors and policy
studies literature, this article moves beyond these critiques
to demonstrate that the effects of co-regulation in UK
alcohol policy extend beyond just diverting time and
resources away from particular effective alternatives such
as price increases and/or restrictions on availability and
marketing. The PHRD had the effect of structuring the
entire policy terrain, dictating both the content and form
of policy debates. It circumscribed the policy space and
institutionalised lines of access and influence for industry
actors. At the same time, it presented public health and
civil society actors with a dilemma about whether to par-
ticipate in structures riven with such conflicts of interest.
This led to both disagreements and divisions within the
public health sector and marginalised these bodies from
policy debates, which were channelled through the RDAN.
Whilst this study focuses on England, its findings are of
wider relevance and offer insights which can inform ana-
lyses and critiques of similar attempts to implement co-
regulatory regimes in other policy settings. This is of vital
importance given the ‘stickiness’ and intuitive attractive-
ness of partnership as a governance principle and the
primacy afforded to it in many policy contexts.
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